PART II: KANT vs MILL - Conclusion
A group of criticisms sometimes made of Kant's position is the result of its formal nature. For example, a person may feel someone's pain, empathize and feel overwhelmed by another's situation. As a result, she may go to that persons aid. Another person encountering the same situation, a Kantian, may rejected these feelings -- they do not determine the moral worth of the action. Instead she may feel that she really doesn't want to help but must out of a sense of duty. While I'm not sure that the person of good will that Kant speaks of could not be reflective of the feeling person, it turns out that the person who really doesn't want to help but forces herself to help is the real moral agent. I will let you sort this out, but I must admit there are many times I don't want to do something, but feel I must out of a sense of duty (like right at this moment, visiting some one in the hospital instead of sitting here typing this lecture). This last point indicates another problem with Kant's ethical theory: Here I have two conflicting moral duties: to finish this introductory lecture or to visit some one who in the past has been dear to me. Kant's formal position offers no criteria for determining what to do in conflicting situations. Is it then necessary to mix ethical positions and appeal to utilitarianism to make my decision. I ought to continue with this lecture because it entails the greatest good (an arguable assumption on my part?) for the greatest number.