JOSH GILLON

Department of Philosophy
Room 212 1879 Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
(609) 356-3856
jgillon@princeton.edu

EDUCATION

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., expected 2011
Department of Philosophy

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

M.A., 2009
Department of Philosophy
Joint Program in Classical Philosophy

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

B.A., 2006
Majors: Philosophy; Classical Studies (Greek Emphasis)
Minors: Psychology; Logic

TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Aesthetics
Ancient Philosophy
Metaethics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Applied Ethics
Logic
Nietzsche
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind

FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS, AND HONORS

The Lawrence S. Rockefeller Graduate Prize Fellowship — 2010–11
Princeton University

University Center for Human Values Graduate Prize Fellowship — 2010–11
Princeton University

Stanley J. Seeger Fellowship (Declined) — 2010
Princeton University

McGraw Center for Teaching and Learning Fellowship | 2009–10
Princeton University

Nominee, Graduate Student Teaching Award | 2008
Princeton University

Graduate School Summer Stipend | 2007–11
Princeton University

Graduate School Fellowship | 2006–11
Princeton University

Second Place, David H. Yarn Philosophical Essay Contest | 2005
Brigham Young University

Nominee, Phi Kappa Phi Essay Writing Award | 2004
Brigham Young University

Phi Kappa Phi | 2004
Brigham Young University

PUBLICATIONS

"Why *30 Rock* is Not Funny (It's Metafunny)" | Under review at
Philosophy and Literature

PRESENTED PAPERS

"Artworks and Interpretations" | January 2011
University of California, Los Angeles

"Art, Interpretation, and the Law" | January 2011
Princeton University

"Artworks and Intentions" | UCHV Graduate Prize Fellows Group
October 2010
Princeton University

"Two Aesthetic Theories" | The Philosophical Society
September 2010
Princeton University

"On the Interpretations (*Plural*) of Artworks" | Dissertation Seminar
September 2010
Princeton University

"Why *30 Rock* is Not Funny (It's Metafunny)" | The Philosophical Society
October 2009
Princeton University

"A Logical Inquiry into Parmenides' Use of *Einai*" | The Oxford/Princeton Seminar
January 2008
Princeton University

"Faith in the Third Evangelist"   The Oxford/Princeton Seminar
                                                                                January 2007
                                                                         University of Oxford

TEACHING

SPRING 2010   Princeton University

> Nietzsche (PHI 306)
> Assistant in Instruction for Alexander Nehamas
> (Led two weekly discussion groups, graded papers, gave a lecture on "The Logical Structure of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*," held regular office hours)

FALL 2009   Princeton University

> Practical Ethics (CHV 310/PHI 385)
> Assistant in Instruction for Peter Singer
> (Led a weekly discussion group, graded papers and exams, held regular office hours)

> Introduction to Logic (PHI 201)
> Assistant in Instruction for Delia Fara
> (Led three weekly review sessions, graded problem sets and exams, held regular office hours)

SPRING 2009   Princeton University

> Nietzsche (PHI 306)
> Assistant in Instruction for Alexander Nehamas
> (Led two weekly discussion groups, graded papers, gave a lecture on "The Eternal Recurrence and Early Greek Philosophy," held regular office hours)

FALL 2008   Princeton University

> Systematic Ethics (PHI 307)
> Assistant in Instruction for Catherine Wilson
> (Led a weekly discussion group; graded quizzes, papers, and exams; gave lectures on "Moral Fictionalism" and "Understanding the Frege-Geach Problem;" held regular office hours)

SPRING 2008   Princeton University

> Introduction to Logic (PHI 201)
> Assistant in Instruction for Adam Elga
> (Led three weekly review sessions; graded problem sets, quizzes, and exams; held regular office hours)

FALL 2007   Princeton University

> Introduction to Ethics (PHI 202)
> Assistant in Instruction for Michael Smith
> (Led two weekly discussion groups, graded papers and exams, held regular office hours)

SPRING 2005   Brigham Young University

> Introduction to Psychology (PSYCH 111)
> Teaching Assistant for Claudia Clayton
> (Led weekly review sessions, graded quizzes, gave weekly lectures on various topics in psychology)

WINTER 2005   Brigham Young University

> Metalogic (PHIL 405)
> Teaching Assistant for Chris Foster (with permission of K. Codell Carter)
> (Held regular office hours)
>
> Predicate Logic (PHIL 305)
> Teaching Assistant for K. Codell Carter
> (Led occasional review sessions; graded quizzes, problem sets, and exams; held regular office hours)
>
> Deductive Logic (PHIL 205)
> Teaching Assistant for K. Codell Carter
> (Led occasional review sessions; graded quizzes, problem sets, and exams; held regular office hours)
>
> Teaching of Psychology (PSYCH 410R)
> Teaching Assistant for Claudia Clayton
> (Led a weekly discussion group)
>
> Introduction to Psychology (PSYCH 111)
> Teaching Assistant for Claudia Clayton
> (Led a weekly discussion group; graded quizzes, papers, and exams; gave semi-weekly lectures on various topics in psychology)

FALL 2004   Brigham Young University

> Deductive Logic (PHIL 205)
> Teaching Assistant for K. Codell Carter
> (Led occasional review sessions; graded quizzes, problem sets, and exams; held regular office hours; gave tri-weekly lectures on logic for a six-week period during the professor's absence)
>
> Introduction to Psychology (PSYCH 111)
> Teaching Assistant for Claudia Clayton
> (Led a weekly discussion group; graded quizzes, papers, and exams)

WINTER 2004   Brigham Young University

> Introduction to Psychology (PSYCH 111)
> Teaching Assistant for Claudia Clayton
> (Led a weekly discussion group; graded quizzes, papers, and exams)

RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

Research Assistant for Daniel W. Graham   April 2005–April 2006
                                                                   Brigham Young University

Research Assistant for Claudia Clayton   January 2005–June 2005
                                                                   Brigham Young University

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Classical Philosophy Library Committee   2010–11
                                  Department of Philosophy, Princeton University

Graduate Student Representative   2009–10
                                  Department of Philosophy, Princeton University

LANGUAGES

Ancient Greek (read), Latin (read), German (read), Spanish (fluent), Portuguese (read)

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

ON THE NATURE, INTERPRETATION, AND EVALUATION OF ARTWORKS

I argue that the question "What is an artwork?" is best answered by institutional theories of art—those that define "artwork" in terms of our institutional art-related practices. Institutional theories of art, in combination with seemingly plausible assumptions, lead naturally to a family of related views: intentionalism about artworks (the idea that whether something is an artwork is determined by the intentions with which it was made), intentionalism about artistic meaning (the idea that how an artwork should be interpreted is determined by the intentions with which it is made), and intentionalism about artistic merit (the idea that the value or merits of an artwork are determined by the intentions with which it was made). Different forms of intentionalism have become increasingly popular in recent years. However, the case for them is uncompelling. More importantly, intentionalism about artistic merit and intentionalism about artistic meaning depend for their plausibility on a misunderstanding of the interpretation of artworks. I argue for a theory of interpretation that makes better sense of our everyday notion of interpretation than the intentionalist view does, that fits better than the intentionalist view with our everyday practice of understanding and criticizing works of art, and that perfectly coheres with institutional theories of art. Roughly, to interpret an artwork is to use it as evidence for the answer to some question one has. This theory of interpretation explains why there is no such thing as *the* meaning of an artwork. It also grounds a view of the evaluation of artworks that explains, among other things, why artworks are such a useful means of evaluating people: our evaluations of artworks are symptomatic of what questions we value having answers to as well as how those answers resonate with our other values.

Primary Advisor: Alexander Nehamas
Secondary Advisor: Gideon Rosen